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Algorithms, Approximation, and Learning in Market and Mechanism Design: "Stable Matching as Transportation"
Presenter
- Federico Echenique
November 6, 2023
SLMath
Algorithms, Approximation, and Learning in Market and Mechanism Design: "Couples can be Tractable: New Algorithms and Hardness Results for the Hospitals / Residents Problem with Couples"
Presenter
- David Manlove
November 6, 2023
SLMath
Algorithms, Approximation, and Learning in Market and Mechanism Design: "Walrasian Mechanisms for Non-Convex Economies and the Bound-Form First Welfare Theorem"
Presenter
- Paul Milgrom
November 7, 2023
SLMath
Algorithms, Approximation, and Learning in Market and Mechanism Design: "The Languages of Product-Mix Auctions"
Presenter
- Elizabeth Baldwin
November 7, 2023
SLMath
Algorithms, Approximation, and Learning in Market and Mechanism Design: "(Near) Substitute Preferences and Equilibria with Indivisibilities"
Presenter
- Rakesh Vohra
November 7, 2023
SLMath
Algorithms, Approximation, and Learning in Market and Mechanism Design: "Beyond Classical Fisher Markets: Nonconvexities and Online Allocations"
Presenter
- Yinyu Ye
November 7, 2023
SLMath
Algorithms, Approximation, and Learning in Market and Mechanism Design: "Dual Reduction and Elementary Games with Senders and Receivers"
Presenter
- Roger Myerson
November 8, 2023
SLMath
Algorithms, Approximation, and Learning in Market and Mechanism Design: "Simple Mechanisms for Non-Linear Agents"
Presenter
- Jason Hartline
November 8, 2023
SLMath
Algorithms, Approximation, and Learning in Market and Mechanism Design: "Mechanism Design for Humans"
Presenter
- Sigal Oren
November 8, 2023
SLMath
Algorithms, Approximation, and Learning in Market and Mechanism Design: "Stability and Learning in Strategic Games"
Presenter
- Eva Tardos
November 9, 2023
SLMath
Algorithms, Approximation, and Learning in Market and Mechanism Design: "Statistical Contract Theory"
Presenter
- Michael Jordan
November 9, 2023
SLMath
Algorithms, Approximation, and Learning in Market and Mechanism Design: "New directions in how computer science can inform the design of economic mechanisms and systems: Automated mechanism design, necessarily exponentially long theories, AI mediators, and fast convergence to high welfare"
Presenter
- Tuomas Sandholm
November 9, 2023
SLMath