Videos

Algorithms, Approximation, and Learning in Market and Mechanism Design: "Walrasian Mechanisms for Non-Convex Economies and the Bound-Form First Welfare Theorem"

Presenter
November 7, 2023
Keywords:
  • market design
  • mechanism design
  • auctions
  • matching
  • approximation
  • equilibrium analysis
  • algorithmic game theory
  • complexity
  • economic theory
  • discrete optimization
  • graph theory
  • mathematical programming
Abstract
We introduce two extensions of the Walrasian mechanism for quasilinear economies to allow agents to report non-concave values and non-convex costs. The extended mechanisms, which always deliver feasible, near-efficient allocations with no budget deficit, are computationally undemanding and nearly incentive-compatible. We also introduce an extension of the First Welfare Theorem allowing us to upper bound the welfare losses from these mechanisms.