The Nash social welfare (NSW) problem asks for an allocation of indivisible items to agents in order to maximize the geometric mean of agents’ valuations. This is a common objective for fair division, representing a balanced tradeoff between the often conflicting requirements of fairness and efficiency. The problem is NP-complete already for additive valuation functions. We present a simple, deterministic 4-approximation algorithm for the Nash Social Welfare problem under the general class submodular valuation functions. The previous best approximation factor was 380 via a randomized algorithm. We also consider the asymmetric variant of the problem where the objective is to maximize the weighted geometric mean of agents’ valuations, and give a (α+2)e-approximation, where α is the ratio between largest weight and the average weight. This is joint work with Jugal Garg, Edin Husić, Wenzheng Li, and Jan Vondrák.